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[L. A. No. 28120. In Bank. Feb. 9, 1965.]

BRADFORD A. ARTHUR, Petitioner, v. THE
COURT OF LOS ANGELES COUNTY,

~)

(1] Oontempt-Proceedings.-Code Civ. Proc., § 1211, establishj~.
the procedure for adjudging persons in contempt of
[2] Id.-Kinds of Oontempt: Proceedings.-Direct contempt,
committed in the court's immediate view and presence,
be treated summarily; all that is required is an order rej3itimr
the facts, adjudging the person guilty, and prescribing
punishment.
[8] Id.-Kinds of Oontempt: Proceedings.-A contempt not in
court's immediate view and presence becomes indirect
tempt, and a procedure more elaborate than that for direC
contempt must be followed to notify the person so charge
and to allow him an opportunity to be heard.
[4] ld.-Proceedings.-In cases of indirect contempt, an afiida,Vit
must be presented to the court stating the facts constituting
the contempt, an order to show cause must be issued, and a
hearing on the facts must be held by the judge. (Code Civ.
Proc., §§ 1212-1217.)
[5] Id.-Proceedings.-The procedure outlined in Code Civ. ~n..L.._
§§ 1211,1212, 1217, for adjudging one guilty of indirect
tempt, contemplates a situation in which virtually none of
facts involved in the alleged contempt have occurred in ,
judge's presence, but have arisen entirely outside the GU1U'..·.,"~
room.
[6] Id.-ProceediDgs-Due Process.-When virtually none of
facts involved in an alleged contempt occurred in the.
presence, due process requires notice and hearing, lest
alleged contemner be convicted ex parte.
[7] Id.-Proceedings-Due Process.-When a lawyer's
consists of his failure to appear, his absence, the o:lllens:ive
conduct, occurs in the court's presence; thus on his reappearance in the eourtroom, due process should be satisfied if the
judge confronts counsel with the eharge and offers him· a
reasonable vpportunity to explain.

{2] See Oal.Jur.2d, Contempt, §§ 5, 53; Am.Jur.2d, Contempt,'
§§ 6,77 et seq.
•
McK. Dig. References: [1, 4-7, 9] Contempt, § 37; [2, 51.Contempt, §§ 2, 37; [8] Evidence, § 74(1); [10, 11] Contempt, § 81;
[12, 13] Contempt, § 80; [14, 15] Contempt, § 15; [16] Contempt,
§§ 15, 56.
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(8] Evidence-Judicial Notioo-Matters Pertaining to OourtsAttorneys.-The Supreme Court may take judicial notice of the
fact that elusive attorneys are a recurring problem in trial
courts, particularly in calendar departments.
[9] Oontempt-Proceedings.-Before an attorney may be held in
contempt for absence from the courtroom, he must be notified
that he is being cited and given a reasonable opportunity to
ahQw why he should be excused.
(10] Id.-Review-Certiorari.-Absent arbitrariness by the judge
sentencing for contempt, the Supreme Court should not annul
contempt proceedings against attorneys who fail to appear in
court pursuant to proper orders when the attorney was afforded
a reasonable opportunity to explain the reasons for his absence.
[11] Id.-Review-Certiorari.-In a proceeding in certiorari to
review an adjudication of contempt, whether the alleged contemner's acts constituted contempt is a jurisdictional question,
and absent evidence showing contempt, the order of commitment should be annuled.
{l2] Id.-Review-Certiorari.-When a judgment of contempt and
commitment order stated that the contemner, an attorney, was
absent when ordered to appear, that he knew his appearance
was required, that he was able to appear, and that he wilfully
neglected to appear, the responsibility of the Supreme Court
on petition for certiorari is merely to ascertain whether the
evidence before the trial court sufficed to sustain its judgment
and order.
[IS] Id.-Review-Certiorari.-In a proceeding in certiorari to
review an adjudication of contempt, the Supreme Court must
accept the factual determination by the trial court that the
explanation given as an excuse for the misconduct was not·
believable.
[14a,14b] Id.-Acts Constituting Oontempt-Misconduct of Attorneys.-Though courtesy would dictate that an attorney advise
the judge personally of the reason for his inability to appear
in court when so required, a contempt cannot rest on an attorney's failure to personally apprise the judge of the reason
for his absence.
[15] Id.-Acts Constituting Oontempt-Misconduct of Attorneys.
-An attorney should notify a responsible officer of the court
as soon as he realizes his inability to appear at a scheduled
time; failing to do so, he assumes the risk of contempt if the

•

[8] See CaI.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 51; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st ed
§ 111).
[14] Attorney's failure to attend court, or tardiness, as contempt, note, 59 A.L.R. 1272. See also Cal.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 29;
Am.Jur.2d, Contempt, § 25.
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reason for his absence is later deemed insufticient to constitute
a valid excuse.
[16] Id.-Acts OonstitutiDg Oontempt-Kisconduct of Attorn.:'
Proceedinp-Eridence.-Punishment of an attorney for being
contemptuous of the judicial process was not inappropriate
where the circumstances were such that any prudent practitioner would have realized that his ease load rendered it impossible to conclude the day without some delay yet the contemner made no reasonable ettort to prevent inevitable conflict
and left the courtroom without notifying the court or his client
that he would be absent, and where his explanation to the
bailiff of his required appearance in another court did not meet
.the reasonable requirement· of notifying the court of· his absence, since he thought he was explaining to the bailiff of a
third court in which he was required to appear.

PROCEEDING in certiorari to review an order of the Su.perior Court of Los Angeles County adjudging petitioner to
be in contempt. Joseph A. Wapner, Judge. Aftirmed.
.
Bradford A. Arthur, in pro. per., and A. Brigham Rose lor ••
Petitioner.
Harold W. Kennedy, CountyCounseI, and Donald K. Byrne,
Deputy County Counsel, for Respondent.
.
MOSK, J.-Bradford A. Arthur, an attorney at law, seeks
a writ of certiorari to review an order of the respondent court
holding him in contempt.
On the morning of April 17, 1964, Arthur had two matters
pending before Judge Joseph Wapner in department 100 of
the Superior Court of Los Angeles County (the criminal
master calendar department), one matter pending in depart.
ment 101, and a jury deliberating in a case in department 107.
Prior to 9 :15 a.m., Arthur notified the clerk in 101 that he
had two matters in department 100, that he intended to be
present and would return shortly. After completing one of
his matters in 100, Arthur was notified by the clerk from 107
that the jury there had just returned. Thereupon Arthur
left 100 lor 107, even though he had the next case on the
calendar in 100. When the next case was called, Arthur was
not present to represent his'client. Judge Wapner, upon being
informed by his clerk that Arthur had just left the courtroom,
sent his bailiif to bring him back. The bailiff found Arthur in
the corridor and stated to him, ., The judge wants you back

.)
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in court now. " Arthur replied that he bad a jury returning
in another court.
Up to this point no factual conflict exists, but the testimony
reveals some doubt as to what Arthur did thereafter.
Two hearings were conducted by Judge Wapner before he
made his contempt order final. At the first hearing, held later
the same day as the incidents related above, Arthur stated he
thought the bailiff who accosted him in the corridor was from
101, although he admitted that he did not go to 101 before
going to 107. At Arthur's request the court held a further
hearing a week later. At that time Arthur testified that he
had gone to 101 and told the clerk that he had a jury returning
in another court, before going to 107. The clerk in 101 testified
that Arthur had been in that court twice during the morning,
but was unable to recall enough details to otherwise corroborate Arthur's version of the events. Consistently, however,
Arthur insisted that he thought the bailiff had been sent by
the judge presiding in 101.
Judge Wapner -was unconvinced by Arthur's testimony.
He found that Arthur in fact knew that the bailiff was from
his court, and that Arthur made no effort to comply with the
order to return to 100. In so finding, Judge Wapner noted
the inconsistent statements about Arthur's proceeding to 101
before going to 107, that Arthur had appeared frequently in
his court, and that the bailiff had served in that courtroom
for more than a year. The judge stated that Arthur had
failed to appear with clients in the past and had a prior contempt conviction in that court for the same offense. Judge
Wapner sentenced Arthur to two days in jail.
.
Two issues are presented in this case. The first is whether
appropriate procedure was followed by the court below, and
the second is whether sufficient evidence exists to support the
finding of contempt.
[1] Section 1211 of the Code of Civil Procedure establishes
the procedure that is to be followed in adjudging persons in
contempt of court. [2] Contempt committed in the immediate view and presence of the court, known as direct contempt,
may be 'treated summarily. All that is required is that an
order be made reciting the facts, adjudging the person guilty,
and prescribing the punishment. [3] If, however, the contempt did not occur in the immediate view and presence of
the court, it becomes indirect contempt and a more elaborate
procedure must be followed in order to notify the person so
charged and to allow him an opportunity to be heard.
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[4] In such cases an affidavit mlist be presented to the court .•
stating the facts constituting the contempt, an order to show·
cause must be issued, and a hearing on the facts must be held
by the judge. (Code Civ. Proc., §§ 1212-1217.)
Whether the failure of an attorney to appear in court when
ordered is a direct or indirect contempt is not a new issue
before this court, but it is nonetheless perplexing. It arose in
Ohulo, v. Superior Oourt (1962) 57 Ca1.2d 199 [18 Oal.Rptr.
507, 368P.2d 107], and Lyons v.Superior Oourt (1955) 43
Ca1.2d 755 [278 P.2d 681]. In both cases the court held that
the contempt was direct, and in both cases a dissenting opinion
,.was rued on this point. The majority opinions in both Ohula,
and Lyons took the position ijlat.all the relevant facts consti-·
tuting the contempt occurred when the . attorney failed to
. appear, and that the burden of offering an appropriate excuse
was on the attorney. (Ohula,v. Superior Oourt, npro" at pp.
203,207; Lyons v. Superior Oourt, npro" at p. '160.)
In the Ohula, case, Chief Justice Gibson wrote a concurring
opinion indicating that elements of both direct and indirect
contempt were present and that the situation was a "hybrid."
He maintained that the statutory procedure for .directcontempt was suitable as long as an appropriate hearing was
held on the question of excuse and that the procedure for
indirect contempt was not required to protect the rights of the
accused. (Ohula, v. Superior Oourt (1962) npro" at p. 207.)
The dissenting opinion in Ohula, pointed out that an element
of the offense is lack of an excuse and that therefore not all
the events constituting the contempt occurred in the "immediate view and presence of the court." No :finding of contempt
can be made until it is determined whether the actions of the
absent person occurring outside the courtroom provided him
with an excuse. (Ohula, v. Superior Oourt (1962) npro" 5'1
Oal.2d 199, 209 [dissenting opinion].) The dissent urged that
summary procedures would violate due process requirements,
that the only alternative is to follow the procedures for indirect contempt, and that" Anything less than the protections
a1forded by these procedures would be inadequate." (Ohula,
v. Superior Oourt (1962) supro" at p. 211.)
[5] We cOi1clude that the procedure outlined in sections
1211, 1212 and 1217 of the Oode of Civil Procedure for
indirect contempt contemplates a tituation in which virtually
none of the facts involved tit the alleged contempt have
occurred in the judge's presence but have arisen entirely outside the courtroom. [6] In such cases, due process requires

)
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notice and hearing lest the alleged contemner be convicted
ex parte. (See In re Oliver (1948) 333 U.S. 257, 273 [68
S.Ct. 499, 92 L.Ed. 682).) [7] Where counsel fails to
appear, however, the offensive conduct, to wit, the absence,
occurs in the presence of the court. Thus, when an absent
attorney reappears in the courtroom, due process should be
satisfied if the judge confronts him with the charge and offers
him a reasonable opportunity to explain.
[8] Elusive attorneys are areeurring problem in trial
courts, particularly in calendar departments, a fact of which
this court may take judicial notice. Three cases of this nature
have reached this court in the past decade, and in each of
those eases there was evidence of repeated offenses by the
attorneys held in contempt. Insistence upon strict adherence
to the procedure for indirect contempt would provide insulation to attorneys who now overextend themselves, and encourage them to go further in trying the patience of trial judges
through absences which obstruct normal courtroom procedure
4Jut border upon being excusable.
[9] Before an attorney may be held in contempt for an
absence from the courtroom, he must be notified that he is
being cited and given a reasonable opportunity to show why
he should be excused. [10] In the absence of arbitrariness
on the part of the sentencing judge, and with a showing that
a reasonable opportunity was afforded the attorney to explain
the reasons for his absence, this court should not annul contempt proceedings against attorneys who fail to appear in
court when properly ordered to do so.
We now reach the question whether the court had sufficient
cause to find this petitioner in contempt. [11] In a proceeding in certiorari to review an adjudication of contempt the
question whether the acts constituted a contempt is jurisdictional, and in the absence of evidence showing contempt,
the order of commitment should be annulled. (Chula v.
Superior Court (1962) supra, 57 Ca1.2d 199, 204-205; Fortenbury v. Superior Court (1940) 16 Ca1.2d 405, 407-409 [106
P.2d 411); cf. In re Zerbe (1964) 60 Ca1.2d 666, 1167-668
[36 Cal.Rptr. 286, 388 P.2d 182).) [12] The judgment and
commitment order in this case stated that Arthur was absent
when ordere'd to appear, that he knew he was required to
appear, that he had the ability to appear, and that he wilfully
neglected to appear. Thus, the responsibility of this court
is merely to ascertain whether there was sufficient. evidence
before the trial court to sustain its judgment and order.
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Evidence supporting the contempt shows that Judge Wapner sent his bailiff to get Arthur; that the bailiff told Arthur
he was wanted back in court; that the bailiff had served in
Judge Wapner's courtroom for over a year; that Arthur had.
appeared in that courtroom frequently during that period;
and that Arthur had been found in contempt in the past for
failing to appear. But none of these facts go to the question
of excuse. If Arthur had a valid excuse for his absence, the
above facts would not support a contempt conviction.
[18] Arthur had two excuses for his absence. One was
that he "thought the bailiff was from another court" and
did not understand that he was to be in Judge Wapner's
:courtroom at that time. This explanation was not accepted
by the court as being believable, and this court must accept
that factual determination. (Bridges v. Superior Courf
(1939) 14 Cal.2d 464 [94 P.2d 983] ; White v. Superior Court
(1895) 110 Cal. 60 142 P. 480].) Arthur's second excuse was
his requirement to appear in another court at the same time
he was ordered to appear in Judge Wapner's court. The commitment· order stated Arthur had the ability to appear in
department 100 when so ordered. But it may be urged that
the notice from the clerk of department 107 that his jury had
returned there was a court order to be present equivalent to
:Judge Wapner's order. Thus, petitioner's ability to return to
Judge Wapner's courtroom would be conditioned upon his
.. disobeying an order of another court. Arthur did inform the
bailiff from 100 that he was unable to comply with the Wapner
order, although he did not tell Judge Wapner personally. (It
should be remembered, however, that Arthur has stoutly maintained he thought he was talking to the bailiff from 101.)
[14&] While courtesy would have dictated advising the
judge personally, the contempt cannot rest upon petitioner's
failure to personally apprise Judge Wapner of the reason for
his absence. Such a rule would place an onerous burden upon
attorneys who find themselves unable, for causes beyond
their control, to make a court appearance. [15] An attorney should notify a responsible officer of the court as soon
as he realizes he will be unable to appear at the scheduled
time. By failing to do so, an attorney assumes the risk that
he may be in contempt if the reason for his absence is later
deemed intufficient to constitute a valid excuse. [Ub] But
we cannot impose a rule requiring an attorney to seek out
the judge personally under every circumstance where he finds
it imposs,ible to appear in court at the appointed hour.

Feb. 1965]
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In effect, we are asked to pass on the question whether an
attorney who has an active trial practice is required to schedule his time in such a way that he will be able to appear in
court at all times when required. Certainly, this problem
encompasses a wide range of situations, including the personal
habits of individuals for punctuality.
When an attorney fails to appear in court with his client,
particularly in a criminal matter, the wheels of justice must
temporarily grind to a halt. The client cannot be penalized,
nor can the court proceed in the absence of counsel. Having
allocated time for this case, the court is seldom able to substitute other matters. Thus, the entire administration of justice
falters. Without judicious use of contempt power, courts will
have little authority over indifferent attorneys who disrupt
the judicial process through failure to appear. Nevertheless,
to require attorneys always to be present when scheduled,
without allowing any flexibility, would be unrealistic.
,Few eases have dealt with the practical problem here presented, and thus we find no ready prescription. The usual
approach is to accept the trial court's factual conclusion that
the absence was unexcused. (E.g., Ohula v. Superior Oourt
(1962) supra, 57 Cal.2d 199.) One ease has suggested that
there can be no contempt when an attorney has two matters
pending in different courts. (Ex parte Butler (Tex.Crim.
App. 1963) 372 S.W.2d 686.)
[16] In the ease before us, we cannot find petitioner's
conduct to have been excusable. While it may be true that he
could not avoid the conflict, he did little to attempt to mitigate the effect of his absence from the proceedings before
Judge Wapner. His client was left unrepresented and the
court lost precious time that vanished forever. Petitioner's
conversation in the hall with the bailiff did not suffice to meet
a reasonable requirement that he notify the court of his
absenee for, in fact, he thought he was advising the bailiff from
101. The facts establish that petitioner arrived at the courtllOuse the morning in question burdened with a easeload that
nny prudent practitioner would realize rendered it impossible
for him to ~onclude the day without a delay in some of the
matters he was handling. He had made no reasonable effort
to prevent the inevitability ()f conflict and delay. When he
departed from Judge Wapner's courtroom he did so in a
callously indifferent manner without notifying the court or
his client that he would be absent. Under these circumstances
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punishment for being contemptuous of the judicial process is
not inappropriate.
The order of contempt .is affirmed.
McComb, J., Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Burke, J.,
concurred.
TRAYNOR, C. J., concurring.-Iagree that the evidence is
sufficient to support the order holding petitioner in contempt of
court. I adhere, however, to the views set forth in my dissenting
opinion in Chula v. Superior Court, 57 Ca1.2d 199, 208 [18
Cal.Rptr. 507, 368 P.2d 107], that sections 1211 and 1217
of the Code of Civil Procedure prescribe the procedure for
adjudicating con tempts of court and that under those provi.
sions an unexcused absence must be treated as an indirect
contempt. Since that ease and Lyons v. Superior Oourt,
43 Ca1.2d 755 [278 P.2d 681], establish that the code provisions do not preclude this court from adopting a different
procdure for determining when an absence is unexcused and
therefore a contempt of court, I concur in the judgment under
the compclsion of those cases.
Tobriner, J., concurred.
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